1990s as a crucial decade in which democratic peace theory, which posited that democracies do not make war against one another, swept the academy. Liberal theorists proved as eager after September 11 to go to war against Iraq as the administration. But throughout the book, Smith refers to Thomas Hobbes as a motivator of theorists of both the neoliberal and neoconservative persuasion. It comes up, for example, in his discussion of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument. The world, according to that argument, was now divided into states that had progressed beyond all the struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the zone of democracy and free markets, and those that remained in “history,” which, as Thomas Hobbes defined the natural state of humankind, was anarchy with all its ugly aspects, and no safety for property.

In one sense, then, it could be argued that what is evident today in world affairs is not really a new departure for the United States, or for any other hegemonic state in the past, but a continuation of conflicts that go back to city–country strife in ancient or even prehistoric times. It is certainly the case, on the other hand, that the temptation to undertake a remaking of the Middle East was too much to resist after the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a counter-force supporting the Iraqi regime. No one expected the war to go on for five years and more. And it is also the case that the deeper American involvement became in putting down the “insurrection,” the more the Bush administration clung to its theory.

As Smith wryly notes, the idea that the behavior of nations could be plotted out in scientific terms shows little understanding of human nature. The peace theory had a fatal flaw: it depended on denying the existence of a Prime Mover to keep peace. Instead, it relied upon the idea that the internal character of a nation determined its foreign policy—automatically. What happens to the theory if a democratic rival emerges to challenge the hegemon? Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld actually spoke to that point in the wake of the brief (in its first phase) war in Afghanistan. He pointed out to a friendly audience that the United States could not rely on any permanent alliance, and that it must always take the position that the mission determines the coalition, not the other way around.

Finally, Smith makes the devastating point that the theorists knew very little of the history of the politics of the Middle East. Instead, all the opponents are seen as uniformly evil—almost as if they were the targets in a Mucinex ad to be blown out of the system. It will be hard for anyone to say after reading this book, that the mission was just, we simply did not do it right.

Lloyd Gardner
Rutgers University


During the second half of the twentieth century, income inequality and congressional polarization have moved almost perfectly in sync. After documenting
this astonishing empirical association, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal construct and evaluate a causal story of the relationship between income disparity and politicians’ ideological separation. This is not an attempt to isolate the first mover in the causal process. Rather, the authors teach us the “dance” that political ideology and inequality have engaged in throughout the modern political era. The result is a book worth even more than the sum of its parts. Not only do readers gain a rich understanding of the relationship between inequality and party polarization, but along the way, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal make significant contributions to other literatures, such as the party shift in the South and the determinants of vote choice.

Following a rigorous but readable presentation of the historical pattern of partisan behavior in Congress, the authors set out to explain the recent rise in polarization. They show that prominent institutional explanations, such as redistricting, party primaries, and Southern realignment do not provide satisfactory explanations of increasing polarization. Chapter 3 thus turns to changing patterns within the electorate as a possible explanation. We learn that as politicians have become more polarized, partisanship and presidential voting have become more stratified by income. In other words, the increasing tendency for high-income Americans to identify with the Republican Party and low-income Americans to side with the Democratic Party may have reduced politicians’ incentives to look for a middle ground on economic issues. The fact that moral and social issues are not a large part of the congressional roll call agenda reinforces the proposed link between rising party–income stratification and congressional polarization.

The authors also show convincingly how polarization can influence income inequality. Here, policy gridlock is the primary causal mechanism. One way polarization can slow policy production stems from the supermajorities required to overcome a Senate filibuster or a presidential veto. Generally, obtaining a supermajority requires bringing together members of both parties; a task that becomes much more difficult as the ideological distance between parties diverges. Because redistributive policies, like the minimum wage, are rarely indexed to inflation (in contrast to social security, which indexes benefits to wages), the maintenance of current levels of redistribution requires new legislation. As polarization, and consequently gridlock, increase, the government will be less suited to respond to increased inequality.

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal also conclude that the stable position of middle-income voters relative to the wealthiest Americans has failed to produce pressure on legislators to overcome polarization and respond to rising inequality. They contend that it is non-citizens, not middle-income voters, whose relative economic status has declined. This evidence stems from the November Current Population Survey (CPS), which, every other year since 1972, has included questions about respondent income, citizenship, and voting. These data, however, truncate the top income category, in some years combining everyone above the 80th income percentile. Research examining the

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal have packed a lot into this book, and I believe readers will learn from and appreciate the attention to detail in the measurement of variables, theoretical discussion, and analysis of causal processes, and attention to alternative hypotheses. I suspect the book’s conclusion, which describes several possible scenarios that might reverse the pattern of congressional polarization—including economic calamity that could result from precariously high real estate prices—will also engage readers for years to come.

Peter K. Enns
Cornell University


For those of us who teach urban politics, there is a recurring issue of how much lecture time should be devoted to a discussion of riots. Obviously, riots are by nature episodic and chaotic. Yet it can be argued that riots are riots, an unconventional form of political participation. Granted, each riot has its own story and meaning for its host city, but these riots also tell us a lot about race and inequality in America. Most large cities experience racial tensions but some escape the destructive impact of a riot. Evidently, there are other forces at work in these cities. This is why a detailed examination of the infamous Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles riots is so instructive. Janet Abu-Lughod, an urban sociologist, compares the historical and spatial contexts of six major riots in these cities. Abu-Lughod’s historical approach allowed her to make several observations about urban formation, political culture, and demographic and class patterns within these cities. If generalizations are possible, then riots reflect the differential political culture and history of their host cities. Abu-Lughod asserts, “I posit a political culture in the city that has evolved from social learning and from the unique history of the city as a port of entry for diverse immigrant groups” (p. 274).

Because Abu-Lughod’s selected cities are the same ones she studied for her book (New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, American Global Cities,