Complicating the Role of Racial Attitudes and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election*

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Abstract: Some scholars argue that Donald Trump's Electoral College victory was predicated on his ability to attract racially hostile white voters. Others argue that the increased relationship between racial attitudes and presidential vote choice in 2016 resulted because racial attitudes and partisanship had become even more aligned following the presidency of Barack Obama. Building on research that shows voters tend to update their policy positions to align with their preferred candidates, we propose a third mechanism that helps account for the strong relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice in 2016. We hypothesize that over the course of the presidential campaign season, many whites shifted their survey responses on questions related to race and immigration to align with their support for Trump or Clinton. To test this argument, we use a unique panel dataset conducted by YouGov of more than 5,000 respondents interviewed at multiple points during the 2016 presidential election. Our results indicate that the strong link between white attitudes toward Black Americans and Trump support observed in prior studies is likely due as much to Trump supporters updating their survey responses to report opinions more consistent with Trump's, as to Trump drawing support from more racially antagonistic voters. We show similar effects with respect to immigration opinion, although Clinton supporters were more likely to update their immigration attitudes, becoming more progressive in their beliefs over the course of the campaign. These findings complicate our understanding of the 2016 election by offering direct evidence that Trump's campaign benefited from *and* catalyzed racial divisions in the electorate. The results also hold implications for how we study election and campaign effects and the stability (or lack thereof) of race and immigration attitudes.

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Donald Trump injected a level of racism into his presidential campaign that many thought impossible in contemporary U.S. politics. He referred to Mexican immigrants as criminals and rapists, he regularly retweeted white supremacists and neo-Nazis, and he was slow to distance himself from white supremacists who endorsed his presidential bid (Bump 2018, Leonhardt & Philbrick 2018, Lopez 2017*a*). Did Trump benefit from this racism by attracting white voters opposed to immigration and with high levels of racial animosity?

While researchers have identified a number of factors that may have influenced voters in 2016, including economic conditions (Sides, Tesler & Vavreck 2017) and sexism (Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018, Valentino, Wayne & Oceno 2018), a growing consensus argues that Trump indeed benefited from his racism and his positions on racially inflected issues (Bouie 2016, Dionne, Ornstein & Mann 2017, Enders & Smallpage 2016, Hooghe & Dassonneville 2018, Jacobs 2018, Jardina 2019, Lamont, Park & Ayala-Hurtado 2017, Lopez 2017*b*, Morgan & Lee 2018, Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018, Sides, Tesler & Vavreck 2017, Tesler & Sides 2016, Tesler 2016*b*, Yglesias 2016). Whites with greater levels of racial prejudice, this prior work suggests, were supportive of Trump relative to other candidates during the Republican primaries, and they were far more likely to vote for Trump over Clinton in the general election, all else equal.

Most of the research on the relationship between white racial attitudes and Trump support is part of a tradition that assumes that racial attitudes are fairly stable predispositions that form early in life and then later become important for political reasoning (see Sears & Brown (2013) for a review). Implied in this line of research is that politicians or political campaigns do not change levels of prejudice, but they can prime these attitudes, or make them more or less salient and therefore more or less politically relevant (Kinder & Sanders 1996, Mendelberg 2001). And consistent with this assumption, most work examining the relationship between candidates' strategic use of racially charged political rhetoric and whites' candidate evaluations, including research on Trump's appeal, has focused exclusively on the extent to which exposure to racist messages makes whites more likely to bring

their racial attitudes to bear on their political preferences (Jardina N.d., Mendelberg 2001, Sides 2018, Tesler 2016*a*, Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002, Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018). Because racial attitudes are thought to be relatively fixed, prior work in this tradition typically assumes that an increase in the relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice reflects voters changing their vote choice to align with their racial predisposition and not vice versa.

Engelhardt (2019) identifies a second mechanism that helps account for the increased relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice in 2016 (Tesler 2016*b*). Specifically, Engelhardt (N.d.) offers evidence that between 2012 and 2016 whites' racial attitudes and partisanship became more strongly associated, as those with more racially antagonistic views sorted more uniformly to the Republican party and those with more racially liberal views sorted more uniformly to the Democratic party. Engelhardt's perspective parallels the above research in that racial attitudes are viewed as antecedent to vote choice, but it differs because the focus is on partisan sorting that happened largely prior to any election-specific factors of the 2016 presidential.[1] One implication of this argument is that the relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice would have been stronger in 2016 than in 2012 regardless of the presidential candidates because sorting by race and partisanship had increased so dramatically over the four years.

While both of these accounts are compelling and supported by evidence, we posit a third factor that helps further account for the strong link between opinion on matters of race and vote choice in 2016. Our theoretical approach builds on the work of a small but growing number of scholars (Engelhardt N.d., Hopkins & Washington 2020) in complicating the long-standing argument that attitudes on matters of race are largely fixed and persistent predispositions, rarely moved by political context or elite rhetoric (Jennings, Stoker & Bowers 2009, Sears & Brown 2013, Tesler 2015). We argue that the strong association between

[1]Engelhardt (N.d.) shows that racial attitudes can influence partisanship and partisanship can influence racial attitudes, but the fact that partisanship is almost always viewed as a predictor of presidential vote choice reinforces the view that racial attitudes are antecedent to vote choice in this perspective.

Trump support and views on racial issues identified in previous studies, most of which use cross-sectional survey data, was not merely a result of Trump attracting racist whites by way of his own racist rhetoric or a reflection of partisan racial sorting that had already occurred; it was also a result of white Trump supporters changing their views to be more in line with Trump's over the course of his presidential campaign. In other words, Trump not only attracted whites with more conservative views on race; he also made his white supporters more likely to express more extreme views on issues related to immigration and on issues like the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and police killings of African Americans. What is more, we also find that the strong association between racial issue preferences and vote choice in 2016 was not merely driven by a conservative shift among Trump supporters. We also find that many of those who supported Clinton began to express more liberal views on immigration as the campaign unfolded.

In making these claims, we argue that the expression of attitudes on racial issues are similar to attitudes on other political issues; they can be malleable, susceptible to change in response to elite messages, political context, the mass media, and other cues in the political environment (Zaller 1992, Lenz 2012). These shifts may be especially likely during elections, when voters are more likely to attend to politics, more likely to be exposed to political and policy information, and most apt to learn about the policy or issue preferences of their preferred candidate (Lenz 2009, Lenz 2012). Our article therefore contributes to a growing body of scholarship, which has documented notable changes in reported levels of white racial attitudes in recent years, including in the wake of the 2016 presidential election (Hopkins & Washington 2020). The evidence we provide also extends recent work, which suggests that some whites update their racial attitudes to align with their partisanship (Engelhardt N.d.). We believe, however, that we are the first to argue that part of the increased relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice in 2016 stems from whites updating their racial attitudes *during* the campaign to more closely align their preferred candidate.

We focus on two attitudes in particular; whites' opinion on racial issues that affect

African Americans and whites' opinion on immigration issues. Much of the prior work on either the responsiveness of white racial attitudes to elite cues or on the link between these attitudes and Trump support has tended to focus on white racial resentment—a measure of white racism that specifically captures whites' attitudes toward blacks Americans (Kinder & Sanders 1996). We agree that more conservative opinions on attitudes toward black Americans are likely strongly tied to Trump support (and more liberal positions to Clinton support), but follow the lead of others who argue that attitudes toward immigration are also becoming an especially important force in American partisan and electoral politics (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015, Hajnal & Rivera 2014, Jardina 2019, Sides 2018). Thus, we consider how attitudes in both these domains might have influenced—and been influenced by—candidate support in 2016.

To test our predictions, we use a unique panel dataset conducted by the survey firm YouGov in which respondents were re-interviewed multiple times during the 2016 presidential campaign. Because vote intentions and attitudes toward African Americans and immigrants were asked of the same individuals at multiple points during the campaign, it is possible to test whether respondents aligned their views on race and immigration to match their preferred candidate, updated their vote choice to match their issue preferences, or both (Lenz 2009, Lenz 2012). We find, like other work, that attitudes toward race and immigration issues indeed mattered for vote choice in 2016. But our panel design allows us to see important nuances in these associations that prior research has missed. While it is true that whites with already conservative opinions on race and immigration were more likely to support Trump early in the campaign (Engelhardt 2019), we do find some evidence that voters shifted their vote intention to align with prior racial attitudes (e.g., Sides 2018). We also find, however, that the relationship between the *change* in racial and immigration attitudes during the campaign and final vote choice is just as strong as the relationship between past racial and immigration attitudes and vote choice. Our findings therefore point to a more insidious and often overlooked consequence of politicians' efforts to race-bait white

Americans. Rather than just making racial attitudes more salient, as previous work suggests, such efforts may actually make some whites' more racially antagonistic—or at least more willing to express racially antagonistic views with respect to certain issues. Consistent with Hopkins & Washington (2020) we also find some evidence that whites who supported Clinton expressed more liberal views as the campaign unfolded.

These findings offer important revisions to both work on racial attitudes and on policy preference formation. First, consistent with Engelhardt (N.d.), they indicate that that whites' expressed racial issue preferences are not as stable as previous work has claimed. Second, they suggest that issue preference learning may not necessarily be limited to complex pubic policies to which citizens typically only give limited attention (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, Lenz 2009, Lenz 2012). The same process can also occur with survey responses related to opinion on issues regarding black Americans and immigration, with important consequences for how we study elections. Our analysis of panel data provides evidence that each of the three mechanisms can account for the relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice in 2016. Cross-sectional analyses, by contrast, cannot identify these separate mechanisms, and thus risk attributing correlations to one particular explanation when many factors are actually at work. What is more, the results also hold implications for how we understand campaign effects. The findings support the conclusion that campaigns do matter (Vavreck 2009), but the evidence that voters shifted their positions to align with their preferred candidate also reinforces the importance of the "fundamentals," like partisanship, in U.S. presidential campaigns (Enns & Richman 2013, Erikson & Wlezien 2012, Gelman & King 1993).[2]

[2]Of course, as noted above, as racial attitudes have increasingly aligned with partisanship, these attitudes have become central to electoral politics even when not part of the campaign.

Why Voters' Views on Race and Immigration May have Changed during the 2016 Campaign

Many scholars have documented a strong correlation in 2016 survey data between whites' racial attitudes and candidate support (e.g., Reny, Collingwood & Valenzuela 2019, Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018) and have noted that this association appears to be stronger than in previous elections (Tesler 2016*b*). These patterns, however, are not necessarily entirely driven by partisan and racial attitude sorting prior to the campaign (Engelhardt 2019) or the fact that some voters were attracted to Trump because of his racist and anti-immigrant comments—or, alternatively, to Clinton because of her more progressive views.

We raise the possibility that some voters changed their views on these issues to align with their preferred candidates. We draw from work outside the domain of racial attitudes and racialized policy preferences to develop two mechanisms, which predict that some whites' may have changed their expressed attitudes on racial issues and immigration to align with their chosen candidate's positions. First, a small number of studies have pushed back on the claim that views on matters of race are very slow to change, being largely impervious to political context or top-down elite cues from the media or politicians (Goldman 2012, Goldman & Mutz 2014, Engelhardt N.d., Hopkins & Washington 2020).[3] We suggest that in the current political environment, attitudes on race and immigration may behave like other issue attitudes, responding to the opinion leadership of political elites, particularly those from prominent candidates of one's preferred political party (Zaller 1992). We draw especially from work by Lenz (2009, 2012), who shows that when survey respondents' policy preferences become more aligned with their vote intention during a campaign, it is typically because respondents learn and take on the positions of their preferred candidate, and *not* because they pick a candidate closer to their issues positions. While Lenz focuses on race-neutral policy positions (like whether to invest social security in the stock market or how much to

[3]This work is part of a long tradition of research on the influence of elite cues on issue preferences and political decision-making. See Gilens & Murakawa (2002) for a review.

spend on defense), we propose that the same effect may occur with racial policy preferences and anti–immigrant sentiments. That is, if respondents learn their favored candidate is racist, they may adjust their future survey responses to more closely align their racialized issue preferences with the candidate's. By contrast, respondents who oppose the racist candidate may adjust their responses away from that candidate.

At first, it may seem surprising that this type of "learning" can occur with deeply held predispositions toward race and immigration. Prior work has suggested that learning is more likely to occur when issues are complex enough that voters, who often have limited time to devote to policy details, do not have strong or established prior views. While there is evidence of growing partisan divides and polarization on racial and immigration issues in recent years (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015, Engelhardt N.d.), there nevertheless remains some partisan cross-cutting on these issues, creating opportunities for learning. Trump, for example, was unique among recent Republican presidential candidates in the extent to which he was unequivocal and unambiguous in his positions. For one, he has a long history of racist behavior and rhetoric directed toward blacks that was well-covered by the media over the course of his presidential bid.[4] During his campaign, Trump was slow to distance himself from the endorsement of white supremacists like former KKK leader David Duke, and he did not shy away from using explicitly racist rhetoric, a strategy contemporary national candidates have generally avoided so as not to appear to be violating norms of racial equality (Mendelberg 2001, Valentino, Neuner & Vandenbroek 2018). Furthermore, Trump's predecessors, like George W. Bush, John McCain, and Mitt Romney, were less extreme on issues of immigration, and they openly pursued Latino voters by presenting their websites and campaign ads in Spanish. Trump, in contrast, did neither, and declared, "This is a country where we speak English, not Spanish" (Goldmacher 2016).[5] Compared

[4]For a list of Trump's racist remarks and behavior, see `https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.html`

[5]When it comes to immigration policy, Mitt Romney recently declared, "I'm more of a hawk on immigration than Trump" (Lima 2018), but he was much more ambiguous about his views on immigration policy during his 2012 presidential bid (Balz 2012). Romney has also consistently expressed less extreme rhetoric on immigration than Trump. For example, in one of his 2018 U.S. Senate campaign ads, Romney said, "Utah

to recent Republican candidates, then, Trump's anti–immigrant rhetoric, in particular, may have provided new and more salient information to both Democrats and Republicans about where the parties stood in 2016 on immigration.

Additionally, even when the underlying and deeply held attitudes or psychological predispositions whites have on matters of race are fairly stable, specific policy positions on racial or immigration issues may be less crystalized than previous work has thought. In particular, when new issues arise, like the Black Lives Matter movement or the building of a border wall, voters' preferences may not be fully developed, and the link between these preferences and more fundamental racial attitudes may be only weakly formed. As a result, public opinion on these issues may be especially susceptible to learning effects over the course of a campaign.

Our first mechanism suggests that Trump's overtly racist behavior may have provided new information to some voters—especially about where the candidates stand on immigration. We suspect a second mechanism may also have been at work. Prior to the 2016 election, many voters were likely already aware that Republicans were more conservative on issues related to race than Democrats. After all, the Republican and Democratic parties have taken different positions on race since the 1940s, when Republican voters and Republican politicians were less likely than Democrats to support policies that would promote racial equality (Chen 2007, Chen, Mickey & Houweling 2008, Carmines & Stimson 1989, Schickler 2016). The relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship also increased significantly during the Civil Rights movement and then strengthened even more during the Obama presidency (Bobo 2017, King & Smith 2011, McAdam & Kloos 2014, Tesler 2016*a*).

However, even if most voters might have assumed that Clinton was more progressive on matters of race than Trump just by way of her partisan affiliation, Trump's ongoing racist and xenophobic comments may have influenced survey responses through a second, more bottom-up mechanism at the mass-level, where respondents learned that expressing extreme

Welcomes legal immigrants from around the world - Washington sends immigrants a message of exclusion" (Reston 2018). Also see Gonyea (2018) for "The GOP's Evolution on Immigration."

responses to questions about racial issues on surveys might be more socially acceptable.[6] It is possible that some respondents harbored racially conservative policy preferences and anti-immigrant sentiments prior to 2016, but because of a widespread norm of racial equality (Mendelberg 2001), they were reluctant to reveal these beliefs. It was not until Trump's campaign that they felt comfortable *expressing* these views in surveys. This process reflects a different type of learning, where Pro-Trump survey respondents may have come to believe from Trump's frequent and exceptionally extreme racial rhetoric that it was now socially acceptable to express racial bias in surveys (Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018, Newman, Merolla, Shah & Lemn N.d.). If so, some of the relationship between racial bias and Trump support observed in 2016 would reflect Trump supporters who harbored racial animus selecting more extreme survey responses because they felt it was more socially appropriate to do so. This mechanism suggests an important addition to the standard view that racial attitudes are highly stable (e.g., Sears & Brown 2013), as the mechanism allows for stable racial attitudes and helps account for when survey responses are more or less likely to align with underlying preferences.[7]

We also note that Trump's victory came in the wake of the presidency of Barack Obama, America's first African American president. Many scholars and political commentators have argued that Trump's victory was the result of a backlash to Obama among many whites who were dismayed at the nation's changing racial and ethnic demographics and of economic and political success of racial and ethnic minorities (Jardina 2019, Sides 2018). Trump, with his promises to unravel many of Obama's policies, likely appealed to the many white Americans

[6]Although this mechanism still depends on Trump's racist rhetoric and behavior, we view this mechanism as more bottom-up because if this process occurred, individuals did not shift their responses to align with a political elite but rather began expressing responses that aligned more directly with their pre-existing attitudes. Examples of Trump's racism and xenophobia include Trump spending years perpetuating the false rumor that Barack Obama was not born in the United States but in Kenya (Jardina & Traugott 2019) and during the 2016 campaign referring to Mexican immigrants as criminals and rapists. He was also was slow to distance himself from the endorsement of David Duke, the former leader of the Ku Klux Klan (Leonhardt & Philbrick 2018, Lopez 2017*a*, Rubin 2016). For additional examples, see: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.html.

[7]It is also possible, perhaps even likely, that if social norms change enough so that someone expresses a view they formally withheld, this process also pushes the underlying attitude in a more extreme direction.

with racially conservative views who wanted a white president who supported their views as president.

But we argue that in addition to racial backlash laying the groundwork for Trump, this political environment may also have set the stage for changes in whites' expressed attitudes on matters of race and immigration via the mechanisms outlined above. Some whites who were uneasy about the racial and ethnic changes in the country that became more apparent during Obama's time in office may not have fully formulated a mental response or reaction. We posit that these whites were poised to adopt more conservative views in these domains when sent a signal about issue positions by a political elite they supported. Others may have held fully articulated views on race and immigration that they were previously uncomfortable sharing, but saw Trump as paving a path that made it acceptable for them to express views they had become increasingly eager to share. We think these shifts are especially likely to happen in the increasingly polarized political environment, in which racial attitudes are becoming increasingly correlated with partisanship as voters update their attitudes to align with their preferred political parties and their favored political candidates (Jardina 2019, Mason 2018, Engelhardt N.d.).

Although this study cannot distinguish between these separate mechanisms—i.e., learning candidates' positions (including learning from candidates how new issues align with racial predispositions) or selecting more extreme responses that no longer appear socially unacceptable—together they suggest that even though attitudes toward race and immigration may be deeply held and slow to change, there are reasons to expect that survey responses on these issues shifted during the campaign, such that voters were changing their positions to match those of their preferred candidate.

Traditionally, scholars examining the relationship between white racial attitudes and candidate evaluations have tended to focus on the opinions whites have about black Americans (Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2012, Piston 2010, Tesler 2016*a*). But the nation's changing demographics, the significant influx of immigrants to the country in the late 1990s and early 2000s,

and politicians' intense focus on the issue of immigration over the past decade mean that whites' orientations toward black Americans are not the only racialized attitudes at play in American public opinion. As a small but growing body of work demonstrates, attitudes toward immigration have become an important lens through which white Americans arrive at their partisanship and their political preferences (Abrajano & Hajnal 2015, Hajnal & Rivera 2014). While attitudes toward other racial and ethnic groups certainly matter, we view our analysis as an initial step toward a more nuanced perspective, taking seriously the idea that in order to accurately assess the relationship between presidential candidate support and white racial attitudes, we must consider both how whites feel about issues related to black Americans and issues related to immigration.

Analysis: Racial Attitudes, Immigration Attitudes, and Support for Trump

Did some voters learn from Trump's racist and anti-immigrant statements and update their survey responses to questions about racial issues to align with their preferred presidential candidate? To answer this question, we employ panel data, which allows us to sidestep a shortcoming in work that relies on observational data drawn at a single point in time. Cross-sectional observational data cannot tell us whether a strong relationship observed between racial attitudes and candidate support is the result of the candidate attracting voters with particular racial attitudes, or if voters are changing their racial attitudes to align with their candidate. In either case, we would observe a strong relationship between attitudes and preferences but would be unable to determine why. Furthermore, cross-sectional data cannot provide information about *when* these relationships emerged. Thus, in order to determine whether voter learning with respect to racial preferences occurred over the course of the campaign, we use a panel survey conducted by YouGov.[8] The survey contains data on over

[8]Details on YouGov survey methodology can be found here: `https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/`. YouGov consistently performs extremely well on a variety of metrics (Rivers 2016).

5,000 panelists (and 3,976 white, non-Hispanic respondents) who originally completed an Economist/YouGov survey between May 8 and June 8, 2015 and were re-interviewed multiple times throughout the 2016 campaign about their vote-intentions and their attitudes toward issues related to African Americans and immigrations.

Racialized Issues Related to Black Americans Over the Course of the Presidential Campaign

We turn first to considering the relationship between opinions on racialized issues related to black Americans. Our measure of racialized issues is composed of two survey questions, which were asked twice during the 2016 presidential campaign—the first time in the February wave, which followed the Iowa Caucus, and then again in the August wave, just over two months prior to the election. The first asked respondents whether they support or oppose the Black Lives Matter movement. The second asks respondents whether they think that police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents. These questions offer several advantages: They were asked at two points during the campaign, and they directly measure opinion on issues associated with black Americans. Furthermore, as we show in Appendix 1, these questions also appear to tap broader feelings of racial resentment.

Our primary goal is to test our hypothesis that many Trump and Clinton supporters changed their opinion on these issues over the course of the campaign in order to align their views with their preferred candidate. Our research design, however, also allows us to evaluate the more common perspective, which is that Trump benefited from his racism primarily by attracting white voters who already had conservative views on racial issues. We begin by examining vote intentions during the campaign (across three survey waves) among those who consistently indicated they strongly opposed BLM and thought police killings of African Americans were isolated incidents. If Trump's racist comments were merely serving to attract these types of voters, then we would expect to see two patterns. First, *after* Trump entered the race, we should find that the number of racially hostile white voters who

expressed support for Trump should be higher than the number who indicated support for a generic Republican candidate. If support among these voters is the same for Trump as it is for any Republican candidate, then there is not much evidence that Trump's racial messaging uniquely attracted these voters. Second, as the campaign progressed and Trump's racial appeals became more apparent by way of greater media attention, we should also expect to find an increase in support for Trump among whites with more conservative positions on race issues.

Figure 1 reports Trump's vote share in May 2015, February 2016, and August 2016. Often, vote intentions are reported as the percent supporting a particular candidate out of the two–party vote (i.e., among those who indicated an intention for either the Republican or Democratic candidate). However, most changes in vote intention during a campaign are likely to occur among the uncommitted. Thus, the percentages in Figure 1 include those who indicated they were undecided, voting for another candidate, or not voting, ensuring we capture all potential shifts in vote intentions among our respondents. Figure 1 includes May 2015 because this survey precedes Trump's official entrance into the campaign on June 16, 2015. The May vote intention question does not mention any candidates. Instead it asks, "If an election for president was going to be held now, would you vote for the Democratic Party candidate or the Republican Party candidate?" Because Trump had not even entered the race, this question offers a baseline of support for the Republican candidate independent of any support based on Trump's racist comments. The other two surveys (Feb. 2016 and Aug. 2016) were selected because the BLM and police shooting questions were asked during these waves, which allows us to measure Trump support and racial views at the same time. We only include respondents who participated in all three of these survey waves to ensure that any panel attrition does not influence the over-time patterns.[9]

[9]If a respondents missed a particular survey wave, they were allowed to participate in subsequent waves, so the total number of respondents is roughly consistent throughout the period of analysis. Lending further evidence that panel attrition does not affect our conclusions, Appendix 8 reports subsequent results incorporating a Heckman selection model, that models panel attrition. The model suggests attrition is random with respect to demographic variables (including partisanship and political ideology). The full survey included 17 waves. The various analyses throughout this paper include data from waves 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, and

Between May of 2015 and August 2016, Trump repeatedly attacked Black Lives Matter, calling the group a "threat" and accusing the group of "essentially calling death to the police" (Campbell 2015, Diamond 2016, Heer 2016). Nevertheless, during this time period, we see no evidence that support for Trump increased (compared to support for a Republican candidate in May of 2015) among those harboring the most racially conservative policy views. The differences in Trump support in February and August are small and not statistically different than general Republican support in May of 2015 among those strongly opposing Black Lives Matter (Panel a) and those who view police killings of African Americans as isolated incidents (Panel b). In short, at least during the first year of Trump's campaign, those whites we might suspect to be most likely to increase their support for Trump due to his racist comments show no evidence of doing so. Instead, the results suggest that those whites who expressed the most racial animus in May 2015 were already predisposed to support any Republican candidate. This initial result is consistent with Engelhardt's (2019) argument that racialized partisan sorting occurred prior to the 2016 campaign.

Next, we consider whether white Americans were actually changing their policy preferences to align with their preferred candidate as they learned about Trump or Clinton's issue positions. Figure 2 offers a preliminary assessment of the learning hypothesis. Panels a and c on the left side of the figure plot the percent of white Trump supporters (those indicating a Trump vote intention at both points in the survey) who strongly oppose BLM and think police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents at two points in the campaign: January 2016 and August 2016. The two right panels of the figure (panels b and d) plot the percent of whites subscribing to each policy position among those indicating a Clinton vote intention in both surveys. If we are right that issue learning is occurring, then we should see a significant conservative shift in opinion on these issues among Trump supporters, and a liberal shift among Clinton voters, between January and August.

Not surprisingly, in Figure 2 we see that those who consistently supported Trump were

16 (the first post-election wave). We selected these waves to analyze because they included the necessary survey questions and allowed for the most comprehensive analysis of campaign dynamics.



(a) Strongly Oppose BLM



(b) Police Shootings Isolated Incidents

Figure 1: The percent indicating a Republican vote intention (May 2015) and Trump vote intention (Feb. and Aug. 2016) during the campaign among those who strongly opposed Black Lives Matter (Panel a) and those who thought recent police killings of African Americans were isolated incidents (Panel b) (white respondents)

much more opposed to BLM and much more likely to view police killings of African Americans as isolated incidents than those who consistently supported Clinton. The y-axis for Trump supporters ranges from 50 to 90% and the y-axis for Clinton supporters ranges from 0 to 40%, so the differences are even more substantial than they appear. The results presented in Panel a in the top left are consistent with our expectations; among Trump supporters, opposition to Black Lives Matter increased by about 16 percentage points from January to

August. Together Figures 1 and 2 suggest that those opposed to BLM did not become more supportive of Trump as he continually attacked the movement. Instead, those who *already* supported Trump became more opposed to BLM. The percent of Trump supporters indicating they thought police killings of African Americans were isolated incidents also increased slightly during this period, but the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the evidence of shifting racial attitudes appears to be limited to Black Lives Matter. There is no evidence that Clinton supporters adjusted their views of BLM or police shootings during this period.



(a) Oppose BLM, Trump Supporters



(b) Oppose BLM, Clinton Supporters



(c) Police Killings Isolated, Trump Supporters



(d) Police Killings Isolated, Clinton Supporters

Figure 2: The percent indicating they strongly oppose Black Lives Matter or they think police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents during the campaign among those who indicated a vote intention for Trump in both Feb. and Aug. 2016 or for Clinton in both Feb. and Aug. 2016 (white respondents).
Note: We use the February survey for vote intentions because vote intentions were not asked in the January wave (when the BLM and police killing questions were asked).

Table 1 offers another look at these relationships. The dependent variables in the first two columns are attitudes toward Black Lives Matter (Column 1) and the beliefs about whether police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents (Column 2). These columns present the relationship between attitudes on these issues and past attitudes on these issues, past vote intentions, past partisanship, and past political ideology.[10] We suspect that if vote intentions among citizens change during the campaign, they are more likely to change among those who are undecided or not planning to vote. Thus, our measure of past vote intentions includes respondents who indicated these options. Past issue positions are those measured in the January wave of the study. All other past variables were measured in the February wave of the survey. Each variable in the model is recoded to range from 0 to 1.

Consistent with the patterns above, in Columns 1 and 2, even when controlling for past issue positions, partisanship, and political ideology, we see evidence of learning. Those who expressed a Trump vote intention just after the Iowa Caucus were more likely to strongly oppose BLM and to view police killings of African Americans as isolated incidents six months later. In columns 3 and 4, we consider the more conventional hypothesis, which is that past issue positions predict later presidential vote intentions. If Trump was primarily drawing support from more racially conservative voters, we should find that past issue positions were strongly predictive of vote intention reported later in the campaign, in August of 2016. We do not, however, find evidence that this is the case. Although the coefficients on our measure of lagged issue positions are positive (0.76 and 0.20), they are imprecisely estimated and the confidence intervals overlap zero. In other words, we cannot conclude that a relationship exists between past views on Black Lives Matter or police killings of African Americans and August vote intentions. Of course, this is just a six-month snapshot of the campaign. Past racial attitudes most certainly influence lagged vote intentions in the model and our subsequent analyses consider changes right before the election. But these results indicate

[10]In Tables 1 and 2, "not sure" responses to partisanship and ideology are recoded as independent and moderate, respectively. Tables A-3 and A-4 show that the results are nearly identical when all partisanship and ideology responses—including not sure—are coded as separate dichotomous variables.

that despite months of attacking BLM, even after the Republican National Convention, the evidence that Trump benefitted from his racism during the campaign by drawing in already racially conservative voters is tepid. Instead, and perhaps even more troublingly, we find strong support for our argument that Trump was shifting the preferences of his supporters, either by actually helping to transform the racial policy preferences of his initial and steadfast supporters, helping supporters learn how these issues align with racial predispositions, or showing them that what is socially acceptable has changed.

Table 1: Racial Policy Attitudes and Vote Intentions: Respondents Appear to Change their Issue Positions to Match their Previous Vote Intention (Columns 1 & 2), *Not* Change their Vote to Match their Previous Issue Positions (Columns 3 & 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Issue Position		*DV: Trump*	
	BLM	Police Killings	*Vote Intention*	
Previous Trump Vote Intention	1.08*	0.93*	4.57*	4.63*
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.54)	(0.53)
Previous Other Vote Intention	0.29	0.07	1.16	1.18
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.67)	(0.68)
Previous No Vote Intention	-0.02	0.01	2.23*	2.45*
	(0.30)	(0.41)	(0.69)	(0.67)
Previous BLM Opposition	5.75*		0.76	
	(0.45)		(0.83)	
Previous Police Killing Isolated		2.78*		0.20
		(0.30)		(0.31)
Previous Partisanship	0.84*	0.56	3.19*	3.30*
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(1.23)	(1.22)
Previous Ideology	1.24*	1.78*	3.91*	3.99*
	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.96)	(0.96)
N	1,485	1,488	1,144	1,143

*=p<0.05; Ordered logit, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data from Jan. and Aug. 2016, white, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category.

Immigration Attitudes During the Campaign

We argued above that whites' racialized issue positions with respect to black Americans were likely no longer the only racialized opinions that routinely underlie presidential candi-

date preferences. In today's political environment, immigration opinion also has a significant impact on political preferences. Trump made immigration a central issue of his campaign from its very beginnings, taking strong anti-immigration positions (Jardina 2019). It would not, therefore, be unreasonable to presume that whites with especially hostile immigration positions would be drawn to Trump. At the same time, our learning hypothesis predicts that Trump may also have influenced many of his supporters' positions on immigration, leading them to take more conservative positions over the course of the presidential campaign.

To test our expectations, we turn again to the YouGov panel study and analyze two questions about immigration attitudes that were asked more than once across the panel period: "Which comes closest to your view about "illegal" immigrants who are living in the U.S.?"[11] and "Do you favor or oppose building a wall across the entire U.S. border with Mexico?" Appendix 2 shows that these questions relate closely to other questions that capture anti-immigrant sentiment.

We begin by examining the conventional hypothesis that Trump support increased over the course of the campaign among whites with consistently anti-immigrant policy preferences. We present our first results in Figure 3, which displays Trump vote intentions among those who consistently favored building a border wall and those who consistently indicated "illegal" immigrants should be required to leave the country. In contrast to the results above, it appears that those who consistently took anti–immigrant positions did indeed gravitate toward Trump over the course of the election. No differences in Trump support emerge between May 2015 and February 2016 among those favoring a border wall or between May and August 2015 among those who think "illegal" immigrants should be required to leave, but by October 2016 and August 2016, respectively, we see that support for Trump among these groups had increased significantly. Whites with prior anti-immigration opinions were in fact more motivated to support Trump toward the end of his campaign.

[11]The three response options were, "They should be allowed to stay in the U.S. and apply for citizenship.", "They should be allowed to stay in the U.S., but not become citizens.", and "They should be required to leave the U.S."



(a) Favor Border Wall



(b) Immigrants Should Leave

Figure 3: The percent indicating a Republican vote intention (May 2015) and Trump vote intention (Sep. and Jun.) during the campaign among those who favored building a border wall in both Feb. 2016 and Oct. 2016 (Panel a) and those who thought "illegal" immigrants should be required to leave the United States in both Sep. 2015 and Jun. 2016 (Panel b) (white respondents)

Figure 4 considers the learning hypothesis. As above, we see some evidence of learning, but this time it is not among Trump supporters but rather Clinton supporters (Panel b) who decreased their support for building a border wall along the course of the campaign.

The magnitude of the decline in anti-immigration opinion is about 12 percentage points from February to October 2016. Of course, it is possible that these shifts reflect longer-term patterns that happen to coincide with the election. Yet, given that Clinton supporters shifted their views on a border wall, which was a key focus during many of Trump's campaign events, we think it is plausible that the change in survey response reflects the 2016 campaign environment. Trump supporters, by contrast (Panels a and c), consistently expressed anti–immigrant preferences, becoming no more or less hostile to immigrants over the time period. As with Figure 2, the overall differences between Trump and Clinton supporters are greater than they appear given the differences in scales on the y-axis.

As above, we also conducted a statistical analysis to re-examine the relationship between immigration opinion and vote intention controlling for partisanship and political ideology. The results of this analysis, presented in Table 2, largely reinforce the patterns in the Figures above, showing learning related to border wall attitudes (Column 1) and vote shifting effects related to both immigration questions (Columns 3 and 4). With all the controls included in the models, we do find that those who previously supported Trump became more likely to support building a border wall, and those who previously supported a border wall or requiring immigrants to leave became more likely to support Trump. Consistent with Figure 4(b), Appendix 5 presents a similar statistical model which shows that past support for Clinton predicts decreased support a border wall. These results suggest that previous cross-sectional evidence showing a stronger relationship in 2016 than in previous elections between anti-immigrant attitudes and vote choice does not just reflect Trump supporters' opposition to immigration; it also reflects the fact that Clinton supporters became more supportive of immigration. Although we find that those who indicated immigrants should leave become more likely to vote for Trump, we do not find evidence that those who intended to vote for Trump become more supportive of the view that immigrants should leave.



(a) Favor Border Wall, Trump Supporters



(b) Favor Border Wall, Clinton Supporters



(c) Immigrants Should Leave, Trump Supporters



(d) Immigrants Should Leave, Clinton Supporters

Figure 4: The percent indicating they favor building a border wall in both Feb. and Oct. 2016 or they think "illegal" immigrants should be required to leave in Sep. 2015 and Jun. 2016 among those who indicated a vote intention for Trump or for Clinton at both time points (white respondents only).
Note: Vote intentions are from August 2015 wave for the first immigrant should leave response because vote intentions were not asked in the September wave.

Table 2: Immigration Attitudes: Respondents Appear to Change their Issue Positions to Match their Previous Vote Intention (Columns 1), *And* Change their Vote to Match their Previous Issue Positions (Columns 3 & 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Issue Position		*DV: Trump*	
	Border Wall	Immigrants Leave	*Vote Intention*	
Previous Trump Vote Intention	1.78*	0.27	3.72*	3.31*
	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.54)	(0.59)
Previous Other Vote Intention	0.01	-0.80	1.34	2.41*
	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.71)	(0.72)
Previous No Vote Intention	0.03	0.55	1.38*	1.13*
	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.66)	(0.63)
Previous Support Border Wall	3.58*		2.06*	
	(0.37)		(0.52)	
Previous Immigrants Should Leave		4.76*		2.51*
		(0.35)		(0.62)
Previous Partisanship	0.37	-0.24	2.31*	3.37*
	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.72)	(0.87)
Previous Ideology	2.57*	2.15*	4.48*	3.56*
	(0.64)	(0.76)	(1.01)	(1.27)
N	1,504	1,139	1,259	670

*=p<0.05; Ordered logit, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data from Feb. and Oct. 2016 (Border Wall) and Sept. 2015 and June 2016 (Immigration), white, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category.

Estimating the relationship between Racial and Immigration Attitudes and Final Vote

The previous analysis covers a large and important part of the 2016 presidential campaign. But the period of analysis did not include *final* votes from November because we needed to restrict the analysis to surveys that included the same questions from two time points, and the November post-election wave did not include the race and immigration attitude questions. We can, however, use the post-election wave of the survey to evaluate the extent to which *prior* issue positions were associated with actual vote choice in November. The vote choices revealed in the post-election wave captured the overall final vote share the candidates received with a high degree of accuracy (within just 0.2% off the actual vote share). We thus feel confident that this final wave offers a valid indication of final vote choice among our respondents.[12]

Our aim here is to compare the effects of racial and immigration issue preferences on final vote choice at two points in time: early in the campaign and near the end of the election. Many public opinion scholars, relying on cross-sectional survey data, will likely estimate the relationship between racial attitudes and candidate support near the end of the election from survey data in which questions about race and vote choice are asked on either the same survey or very close together in time. The 2016 American National Election Study (ANES), for example, asked the standard four-item measure of racial resentment, questions about immigration, and opinions about Black Lives Matter on the post-election wave of the survey—the same wave of the study in which respondents were asked about their vote choice. But if we are right and issue position learning is happening over the course of the campaign, then scholars estimating the effect of racial attitudes on vote choice late in the campaign—using data like the ANES—might unintentionally overstate the extent to which pre-existing racial attitudes drew support or opposition for a particular candidate. In other words, our hypothesis predicts the relationship between racial and immigration issue

[12]Specifically, 48.4% of respondents indicate a Clinton vote in the final wave (the actual share was 48.2%) and 45.9% indicated a Trump vote (the actual share was 46.1%).

preferences on vote choice will reflect the influence of survey respondents' prior attitudes on vote choice *as well as* their survey responses that shift during the campaign to align with their preferred candidates. Additionally, analyses using a single cross-section, cannot differentiate between campaign effects and shifts that occurred prior to the start of the campaign (Engelhardt 2019).

To evaluate the various hypotheses, we estimate the relationship between racial and immigration policy attitudes measured early in the campaign and respondents' *change* in these attitudes during the campaign on final vote choice in November.[13] These variables allow us to estimate the relationship between prior racial attitudes and vote choice independent of the potential influence of racial and immigrant attitudes that shifted during the campaign. In previous analyses, to get a better sense of relative influence of past attitudes and past vote intentions, we used separate equations to analyze each of the racial attitude and immigration attitude questions. For this analysis, which is designed to evaluate the overall influence of past attitudes on final vote intention, we analyze these questions in the model together. Because each of the two racial attitude questions and the two immigration attitude questions are highly correlated with each other (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2), we combine the items into two indices: opposition to black support and opposition to immigrant support. We also control for a host of other factors usually related to presidential vote choice, including partisanship, political ideology, education, income, employment status, age, and gender. Figure 5 reports the predicted change in the probability (and 95 percent confidence interval) of voting for Trump if each variable shifted from its minimum to maximum value, while holding all other variables at their mean (full results are reported in Appendix 7). We are most interested in comparing the shift in predicted probabilities across variables. Several results stand out.

Looking at the top of the figure, the relationship between opposition to black support

[13]Variables from early in the campaign, including demographic variables, come from the January and February waves of the survey. Change in racial attitudes is measured between January and August. Change in immigration attitudes is measured between February and September/October.

and final vote choice is statistically significant. This relationship did not emerge in Table 1 when we analyzed vote intentions earlier in the campaign, suggesting that the relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice became more pronounced much closer to the election. (Consistent with this interpretation, Appendix 6 shows the previous results in Table 1 persist, even when analyzed with the racial index variable.) The significant relationship between opposition to immigrants and vote choice parallels the findings in Table 2. Consistent with expectations, we also observe significant relationships between *changes* in opposition to black support and opposition to immigrants and final vote choice. And the magnitude of these relationships is substantial, on par with what are typically the most powerful predictors of presidential vote, previously expressing an intention to vote for Trump, partisanship, and with political ideology.

Of course, we do not know the exact cause of the change in racial and immigration attitudes, but given Trump's focus on these issues during the campaign and the evidence in Tables 1 and 2 that prior Trump support predicts more conservative views on Black Lives Matter, the police killing of African Americans, and a border wall, while controlling for past views on these same issues, the evidence suggests that the campaign accounts for much of this change. Thus, the strong relationship between change in attitudes during the campaign and final vote choice offers further support for our argument that presidential candidates are not always drawing support, early in their campaigns, from voters who already share their racialized issue preferences. In the case of Trump support in 2016, we find across our analysis in this paper that Trump was not merely attracting whites who already possessed more racially antagonistic views. He was also helping to shape whites' views on these matters, a phenomenon that likely contributed significantly to the strong relationship in cross-sectional survey data that scholars have observed between white preferences on matters of race and immigration and a preference for Trump.

The control variables in the model also speak to other literature on the 2016 campaign. The estimated relationships for income and employment status are not statistically differ-



Figure 5: The Estimated Relationship between Racial and Immigration Attitudes, Change in Racial and Immigration Attitudes, and the Probability of Voting for Trump vs. Clinton, Conditioning on Political and Demographic Variables)
Note: Estimates reflect the expected change in the probability of a Trump vote and associated 95 percent confidence intervals, shifting each variable from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables at their mean. Full regression results are reported in Appendix 7.

ent from zero, consistent with research finding that personal economic circumstances were not significantly related to vote choice in 2016 (Jardina 2019, Mutz 2018).[14] Those who previously indicated a candidate preference of "other" or that they would not vote were significantly more likely to end up voting for Trump. Some research argues that these in-

[14]The one exception is the 28 respondents who indicated their family earned more than $150,000 the previous year but did not specify how much more. These individuals were more likely to vote for Trump.

dividuals were late deciders (Kennedy, et. al. 2018), perhaps influenced by late-breaking campaign information, while others find that media effects during the final weeks of the campaign had little to no effects on the outcome (Wlezien & Soroka 2018) and that those who appeared to "break late" for Trump were identifiable earlier in the campaign (Enns & Schuldt 2016, Enns, Lagodny & Schuldt 2017).

Conclusions and Implications

Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, "It is often said that Trump has no real ideology, which is not true—his ideology is white supremacy, in all its truculent and sanctimonious power" (Coates 2017). Yet, Trump received 62,984,828 votes and won the Electoral College. Many political scientists and journalists have concluded that a large portion of these votes were *because* of Trump's racism. We demonstrate here, however, that the relationship between race and Trump support is much more complicated, and perhaps more troubling, than previous work has illustrated. We find some evidence, consistent with prior work, that whites with policy preferences more hostile to black Americans and to immigrants were more likely to vote for Trump. But perhaps most importantly, we find evidence that Trump also helped transform some white supporters' policy preferences in these domains. Trump was, we argue, both a symptom and a cause of these notable relationships; he both attracted voters with conservative views on matters of race and immigration, and he also transformed some his supporters' views on these issues.

These results suggest that Lenz's (2009, 2012) work on policy learning during campaigns may have an even broader scope than previously thought. We are limited in our ability to determine whether Trump's own overt racism simply made some whites feel like it was more socially acceptable to express more conservative views on issues related to BLM and immigration, or if real attitude change occurred. But we think it is indeed likely that some voters were sincerely updating their policy preferences to align with those of their preferred candidates, especially since we also found that many Clinton supporters actually became

more liberal in their immigration attitudes over the course of the election—a result we would not expect if shifting social desirability bias was the only mechanism.[15]

We recognize that our analysis was limited to racial policy preferences, rather than to more abstract measures of racial attitudes like racial resentment (although we note in the appendix the very strong correlation between the issues in our analysis and the standard measure of racial resentment). Much of the prior work on racial resentment demonstrates that it is a fairly stable predisposition, resistant to change. Had we therefore been able to conduct our analysis with a measure like racial resentment, it is possible we may have observed more attitude consistency.[16] At the same time, however, recent work has called into question the actual stability of some racial attitudes, suggesting that many white Americans are actively updating their racial beliefs to more closely align with their partisan identities (Engelhardt N.d.). Our findings are consistent with this research; we suggest that whites may be updating their racial attitudes and racial issue preferences to align not just with their partisan preferences but also with their candidate preferences over the course of a political campaign.

Our results provide some important considerations for work that examines issue preference and candidate support, often with the presumption that issue positions are causally prior to the decision to endorse one political candidate over the other. Here we show that issue positions in two racialized areas were indeed associated with support for either Trump or Clinton, but we also find that political candidates can have a powerful effect on issue preferences over the course of a national campaign. Our findings, therefore, not only point to the need to reconsider the stability of racial attitudes, particularly in this polarized and racially charged political environment. They also suggest a need to employ panel data more

[15]Another possibility is that some of these shifts reflect what Bullock, Gerber, Hill & Huber (2015) refer to as "partisan cheerleading," where some partisans select survey responses that they know to be false but they believe make their party look better. Although Bullock et al. focused on factual beliefs instead of attitudes, evaluating whether some of the changes we observe in racial attitudes and immigration attitudes reflect sincere shifts as opposed to a type of "cheerleading" is an important potential extension for future research.

[16]Questions measuring racial resentment were, unfortunately, not available at multiple points on the YouGov panel study.

often, when possible, to study the relationships between issue preferences, attitudes, and candidate evaluations.

Our results also paint a potentially more pessimistic picture than much literature on race and the 2016 election. Rather than driving whites away with his racially charged rhetoric, or at least limiting his appeal to those whites who were already antagonistic to black Americans and immigration, we find that Trump may have pushed many whites to become more hostile toward these groups—an outcome that does not bode well for the future of race relations in the U.S., particularly if future political candidates attempt to adopt racialized strategies similar to Trump's. Even if they lose, our results show that when politicians race-bait white voters during political campaigns, they may not merely be making pre-existing racial hostilities more salient, they may also be contributing to greater levels of racial animus among their core supporters.

If there is room for optimism, it is that we find that even in the midst of a vitriolic campaign, some white voters moved in a more racially liberal direction. Specifically, we found many Clinton supporters became more opposed to building a border wall, a policy associated with Trump's anti-immigrant statements made throughout his campaign. We cannot know for sure whether this shift was a backlash to Trump's racism (Hopkins & Washington 2020), if Clinton supporters were learning Clinton's more liberal positions on immigration and updating accordingly, or whether this was part of a more long-term trend toward more public support for immigration. Nevertheless, there appear to be some countervailing effects to Trump's racial appeals. Indeed, when looking at aggregate data, the overall shift in racial attitudes since Trump entered office appears to be in a liberal direction (Hopkins & Washington 2020). One important avenue for future work, therefore, will be to understand the extent to which white voters of various political predispositions are willing to learn and adopt less racially hostile issue positions.

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Supplementary/Online Appendix

Complicating the Role of Racism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Peter K. Enns & Ashley Jardina

Contents

Appendix 1 Attitudes toward BLM and police killings of African Americans tap broader feelings of racial resentment

Although our focus is on attitudes toward issues that affect black Americans, such as support for Black Lives Matter and whether or not police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents, it is important to note that these questions also tap broader feelings of racial resentment. The August wave of the survey asked several questions that measure racial resentment. Since these questions were only asked during one survey wave, we cannot use them for our panel analysis, which depends on the same respondents answering the same questions at two time points. We can, however, use the August wave to see how our two questions of interest (support for BLM and beliefs about whether police killings of African Americans are isolated incidents) correspond with other questions that have been shown to measure racial resentment.

We have eight questions that measure racial resentment and attitudes toward issues that affect African Americans. Table A-1 reports factor loadings, which show that the items all load onto a single factor with an Eigen Value of 4.56 (Cronbach's alpha=0.91). The two questions shown in bold (support/oppose Black Lives Matter and whether police killings of African Americans were isolated incidents or part of a larger pattern) were asked twice during the campaign. The first time in the February wave, which followed the Iowa Caucus, and then again in the August wave, just over 2 months prior to the election. Table A-1 shows these questions load strongly onto the underlying dimension (0.83 and 0.75), suggesting that these questions are important indicators of racial resentment toward African Americans.

While our specific interest is issues that affect African Americans, these results show that our findings likely apply to the broader concept of racial resentment. We list exact question wording below.

Table A-1: Factor Loadings of the Racial Attitude Questions in the YouGov Survey

Oppose the movement called Black Lives Matter	0.833
Blacks have gotten less then they deserve (Disagree)	0.833
Blacks should work their way up	0.828
Generations of slavery and discrimination matter (Disagree)	0.821
If Blacks would only try harder	0.814
Killings of African-American men by police are isolated incidents	0.753
Affirmative action programs... bad thing	0.692
Disapprove of marriage between blacks and whites	0.312

N=2,477; Items load onto a single factor (Eigen Value = 4.56).
All questions were asked in the August wave of the survey.
Questions in bold were asked in two survey waves.

Appendix 1.1 Question Wording (Race)

1. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)

2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)

3. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites. (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)

4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)

5. Do you support or oppose the movement called Black Lives Matter? (Strongly approve, Approve somewhat, Neutral, Disapprove somewhat, Disapprove strongly, Not sure)[17]

6. Do you think recent killings of African-American men by police are isolated incidents or part of a larger pattern in the police's treatment of African Americans? (Isolated incidents, Part of a larger pattern, Not sure)

7. In general, do you think affirmative action programs designed to increase the number of black and minority students on college campuses are a good thing or a bad thing? (A good thing, A bad thing, Not sure)

8. Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between blacks and whites? (Approve, Disapprove, Not sure)

Appendix 2 Attitudes toward immigration tap broader feelings of xenophobia

We also found that attitudes toward the two questions about immigration that we analyzed, which were asked more than once, also correspond closely with attitudes toward other immigration questions that were just asked in a single survey. Table A-2 shows that the four questions all load strongly onto a single factor (Eigen Value = 2.24, alpha = 0.85). The two questions in bold (Which comes closest to your view about "illegal" immigrants who are living in the U.S.? and Do you favor or oppose building a wall across the entire U.S. border with Mexico?) were the focus on our analysis.

[17]Not sure and Neutral categories were combined as the middle category.

Table A-2: Factor Loadings of the Immigrant Attitude Questions in the YouGov Survey

"Illegal" immigrants should be required to leave	0.796
Favor building a wall	0.755
Immigration hurts the United States	0.741
Undocumented immigrants should be required to leave	0.700

Items load onto a single factor (Eigen Value = 2.24). N=1,908
Questions from June, August, and September 2016 waves.
Questions in bold were asked in two survey waves.

Appendix 2.1 Question Wording (Immigration)

1. Which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who are living in the U.S.? They should be allowed to stay in the U.S. and apply for citizenship. They should be allowed to stay in the U.S., but not become citizens. They should be required to leave the U.S.

2. Do you favor or oppose building a wall across the entire U.S. border with Mexico?

3. Which comes closer to your view about how to handle undocumented immigrants who are now living in the U.S.? Percent There should be a way for them to stay in the country legally, if certain requirements are met. They should not be allowed to stay in this country legally.

4. Would you say that immigration... Helps the United States more than it hurts or Hurts the United States more that it helps

Appendix 3 Additional Question Wording

1. **vote intention (generic):** If an election for president was going to be held now, would you vote for... The Democratic Party candidate, The Republican Party candidate, Other, Not sure, I would not vote.

2. **vote intention (primary):** If the candidates for President were Hillary Clinton as the Democrat and Donald Trump as the Republican, would you vote for... Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Other, I would not vote.

3. **vote intention:** How will you vote in the election for U.S. President in November 2016?... Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Other, Not sure, Will not vote for President.

4. **partisanship:** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean Republican, Not very strong Republican, Strong Republican, Not sure.

5. **political ideology:** In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Very liberal, Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, Very conservative, Not sure.

6. **no gun restrictions:** Do you think gun control laws should be made more or less strict than they are now? Guns should be banned completely, More strict, Kept the same, Less strict, There should be no restrictions on guns, Not sure.

7. **abortion illegal:** Which comes closest to your position on abortion? Do you think abortion should be... Legal in all cases, Legal in most cases, Illegal in most cases, Illegal in all cases?

8. **oppose minimum wage:** Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to $15 per hour? Favor, Oppose, Not sure.

9. **education level:** What is the highest level of education you have completed? No high school, High school graduate, Some college, 2-year degree, 4-year degree, Post-graduate degree.

10. **family income:** Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? Less than $10,000, $10,000-$19,999, $20,000-$29,999, $30,000-$39,999, $40,000-$49,999, $50,000-$59,999, $60,000-$69,999, $70,000-$79,999, $80,000-$99,999, $100,000-$119,999, $120,000-$149,999, $150,000 or more, $150,000 - $199,999, $200,000 - $249,999, $250,000 - $349,999, $350,000 - $499,999, $500,000 or more. "Prefer not to say" recoded as a separate variable. $150,000 or more (not specific) recoded as a separate variable (28 respondents).

11. **unemployed:** Which of the following best describes your current employment status? Full-time employed, Part-time employed, unemployed or temporarily on layoff, Retired, Permanently disabled, Homemaker, Other.

12. **age:** Derived from respondent birth year. (In what year were you born?)

13. **gender:** Are you male or female?

14. **race/ethnicity:** What racial or ethnic group best describes you? White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Middle Eastern, Mixed, Other

Appendix 4 Partisanship and Ideology: Alternate Measurement

Tables 1 and 2 in the text report analyses that treat partisanship and ideology as ordinal variables, with "not sure" responses coded as independent for partisanship and moderate for political ideology. Tables A-3 and A-4 replicate these analyses with all partisanship and ideology responses—including "not sure"—coded as separate dichotomous variables. The key findings are nearly identical showing that our results are not sensitive to how partisanship and ideology are coded.

Table A-3: Racial Policy Attitudes and Vote Intentions: Respondents Appear to Change their Issue Positions to Match their Previous Vote Intention (Columns 1 & 2), *Not* Change their Vote to Match their Previous Issue Positions (Columns 3 & 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Issue Position		*DV: Trump*	
	BLM	Police Killings	*Vote Intention*	
Previous Trump Vote Intention	0.97*	0.75*	4.77*	4.85*
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Previous Other Vote Intention	0.30	-0.06	1.32*	1.41*
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.63)	(0.64)
Previous No Vote Intention	-0.02	-0.01	2.59*	2.77*
	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.66)	(0.73)
Previous BLM Opposition	5.71*		0.70	
	(0.44)		(0.86)	
Previous Police Killing Isolated		2.74*		0.14
		(0.30)		(0.28)
N	1,485	1,488	1,144	1,143

*=p<0.05; Ordered logit, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data from Jan. and Aug. 2016, white, non-hipanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category. Partisanship and Ideology categories modeled as separate dichotomous variables (not shown).

Table A-4: Immigration Attitudes: Respondents Appear to Change their Issue Positions to Match their Previous Vote Intention (Columns 1 & 2), *And* Change their Vote to Match their Previous Issue Positions (Columns 3 & 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	DV: Issue Position		*DV: Trump*	
	Border Wall	Immigrants Leave	*Vote Intention*	
Previous Trump Vote Intention	1.86*	0.22	3.88*	3.80*
	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.46)	(0.59)
Previous Other Vote Intention	0.03	-0.98*	1.36*	3.10*
	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.68)	(0.87)
Previous No Vote Intention	0.06	0.34	1.63*	1.78*
	(0.52)	(0.35)	(0.64)	(0.61)
Previous Support Border Wall	3.61*		2.12*	
	(0.35)		(0.64)	
Previous Immigrants Should Leave		4.99*		2.78*
		(0.36)		(0.72)
N	1,505	1,139	1,259	605

*=p<0.05; Ordered logit, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data from Feb. and Oct. 2016 (Border Wall) and Sept. 2015 and June 2016 (Immigration), white, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category. Partisanship and Ideology categories modeled as separate dichotomous variables (not shown).

Appendix 5 Past Clinton Support Predicts Decreased Support for a Border Wall

Consistent with our learning hypothesis, Figure 4(b) in the text showed that Clinton supporters decreased support for a border wall as the campaign unfolded. Here, we show additional evidence of this pattern by regressing border wall attitudes from October 2016 on past Clinton support, past Trump support, and past border wall attitudes. The significant positive coefficient for Previous Trump Vote Intention matches the result in Column 1 of Table 2. The negative and significant coefficient for Previous Clinton Vote Intention shows that those who supported Clinton in February of 2016 were less likely to support a border wall in October.[18]

Table A-5: Immigration Attitudes: The relationship between past vote intentions (Clinton and Trump) and Support for a border wall, controlling for past border wall support

	Support Border Wall
Previous Clinton Vote Intention	-0.69*
	(0.31)
Previous Trump Vote Intention	1.86*
	(0.30)
Previous Support Border Wall	3.75*
	(0.35)
N	1,505

*=p<0.05; Ordered logit, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data from Feb. and Oct. 2016 (Border Wall), white, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Not voting and other are the baseline vote intention category.

Appendix 6 Replicating Table 1 with the racial attitude index variable

The results in Table 5 differ from other analyses in that opposition to black support is a significant predictor of final vote choice. To ensure that this result reflects differences in final vote choice, and not our decision to use an index of opposition to black support (as opposed to separate measures), we repeat Table 1 using the index variable. Consistent with previous findings in Table 1, the index of opposition to black support is *not* a significant predictor of vote intentions three months prior to the election (Column 2).

[18]Because this analysis includes past Trump support and past Clinton support, we do not control for past partisanship or past ideology in this model. Although we would like to be able to identify these relationships separately, the especially strong relationship between partisanship, ideology, and Clinton support does not allow us to estimate separate effects.

Table A-6: Racial Policy Attitudes and Vote Intentions: Respondents Appear to Change their Issue Positions to Match their Previous Vote Intention (Columns 1), *Not* Change their Vote to Match their Previous Issue Positions (Columns 2), Even when Using an Index of Opposition to Black Support

	(1) *DV: Opposition to Black Support*	(2) *DV: Trump Vote Intention*
Previous Trump Vote Intention	0.13*	4.56*
	(0.03)	(0.53)
Previous Other Vote Intention	0.05	1.14
	(0.04)	(0.67)
Previous No Vote Intention	0.03	2.32*
	(0.04)	(0.67)
Previous Opposition to Black Support	0.59*	0.69
	(0.04)	(0.86)
Previous Partisanship	0.07	3.24*
	(0.04)	(1.22)
Previous Ideology	0.15*	3.90*
	(0.04)	(0.97)
N	1,491	1,145

*=p<0.05; Data from Jan. and Aug. 2016, white, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category.

Appendix 7 Full Results for Figure 5

Table A-7 presents the full results that were used to generate the predicted probabilities reported in Figure 5.

Table A-7: Resentment toward African Americans, Immigration, and Trump Vote

Opposition to Black Support	2.34*
	(0.64)
Δ Opposition to Black Support	3.23*
	(1.40)
Opposition to Immigrants	1.09*
	(0.52)
Δ Opposition to Immigrants	3.29*
	(1.43)
Trump Vote Intention	3.84*
	(0.43)
Other Vote Intention	2.47*
	(0.81)
No Vote Intention	1.65*
	(0.53)
Partisanship	2.28*
	(0.67)
Ideology	3.96*
	(0.92)
Education Level	-1.73*
	(0.58)
Family Income	0.76
	(0.85)
Income Not Reported	0.94
	(1.26)
Income > $150,000	2.56
	(1.41)
Unemployed	0.26
	(1.22)
Age	0.36
	(0.81)
Female	0.17
	(0.37)
N	1,136

*=p<0.05; Logistic regression, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. White, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category.

Appendix 8 Evidence that Panel Attrition Does *Not* Influence the Findings

Each analysis reported in the text only includes respondents who participated in each relevant wave. For example, Figure 1 reported the percentage of respondents who indicated a Republican or Trump vote intention at three time points. These percentages are *only* based on respondents who responded to all three of these waves, so attrition could not explain the over-time patterns. The same is true for all of the paper's analyses.

However, to further ensure that attrition was not a factor, we used a Heckman Selection model to estimate the probability of attrition. Table A-8 reports the results of this model for the analysis used to generate Figure 5. We focus on this analysis, because this analysis covers the longest time period of the paper, meaning this is the most likely case for panel attrition to affect our results. Nevertheless, we find no evidence of non-random attrition. Specifically, λ is not significant (p=0.953) and consistent with this result only one of the variables in the model of attrition (south) is statistically different from zero. Further, although the significant variables in Figure 5 remain significant and the estimated relationship between Δ Opposition to Black Support, Δ Opposition to Immigrants, and Trump vote are again roughly equivalent to or larger than past opposition to black support, past opposition to immigrants, partisanship, and ideology.

Table A-8: Replication of Figure 5 Model with a Heckman Selection Model

	Trump Vote	Attrition
Opposition to Black Support	0.14*	
	(0.03)	
Δ Opposition to Black Support	0.24*	
	(0.07)	
Opposition to Immigrants	0.11*	
	(0.03)	
Δ Opposition to Immigrants	0.34*	
	(0.08)	
Trump Vote Intention	0.56*	
	(0.03)	
Other Vote Intention	0.36*	
	(0.04)	
No Vote Intention	0.26*	
	(0.04)	
Partisanship	0.20*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.30)
Ideology	0.12*	-0.16
	(0.04)	(0.38)
Education Level	-0.05*	0.19
	(0.02)	(0.29)
Family Income	0.00	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.39)
Income Not Reported	-0.02	-0.39
	(0.04)	(0.56)
Unemployed	0.01	0.16
	(0.03)	(0.45)
Age	0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.42)
Female	0.01	0.05
	(0.01)	(0.16)
Midwest		-0.61
		(0.38)
South		-0.91*
		(0.36)
West		-0.70
		(0.38)
λ	-0.01	
	(0.21)	
N	1,168	

*=p<0.05; Heckman Selection Model, with survey weights. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. White, non-Hispanic respondents only. All variables re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. Clinton is the baseline vote intention category.