

Polls and Elections

Using Approval of the President's Handling of the Economy to Understand Who Polarizes and Why

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The authors utilize data from nearly 200 surveys conducted during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations to evaluate whose presidential evaluations polarize and why. Specifically, assessments of the president's handling of the economy among high-, middle-, and low-education Democrats, independents, and Republicans are considered. The authors find only weak evidence that education moderates partisan evaluations of the president. Throughout the period of analysis, there are more similarities across partisan groups than differences. However, midway through Bush's first term in office, polarization becomes pronounced. Statistical analysis suggests that this pattern arises because Republicans no longer incorporated economic information into their evaluations, as they did during the Clinton presidency.

Partisan polarization has become an important feature of American politics. Those studying political institutions (Binder 1999, 2003; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) as well as public opinion and voting (Bartels 2000; Bond and Fleisher 2001; Gelman 2008; Hetherington 2001) have documented the increasing importance of partisanship. Additionally, Prior (2007) has shown how the expanding media environment contributes to a polarized electorate. Perhaps not surprisingly, Republicans' and Democrats' approval of the president has also polarized in recent years (Fox 2009;

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Jacobson 2007, 2009).¹ Despite evidence that presidential approval ratings influence all branches of government, we know very little about whose evaluations are polarizing and for what reasons.² We do not know whether some partisan groups are polarized more than others. For example, is it the most or the least educated who are driving the polarization? Similarly, we do not know much about the conditions in which Democrats and Republicans have polarized in their presidential evaluations.

To address these questions, we utilize all available Gallup and CBS polls on economic approval of the president from 1993 to 2005—almost 200 surveys in total. These surveys offer several advantages. First, the frequency of the surveys allows us to evaluate partisan opinion change on a monthly basis. Second, by obtaining the individual-level data for each survey, we are able to disaggregate respondents by both their education level and partisanship. Although research shows similar patterns of opinion change across education groups (Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Page and Shapiro 1992; Soroka and Wlezién 2008), there are strong theoretical reasons to suspect that when we disaggregate by partisanship *and* education, differences will emerge (Zaller 1992).

Finally, we selected these surveys because each asks respondents whether they approve of the president's handling of the economy. Focusing on approval of the president's handling of the economy allows us to better isolate the key sources of polarization. Unlike approval of the president's overall job performance, where Democrats and Republicans might observe the same reality and formulate divergent evaluations, for economic approval, we expect partisans of all stripes to prefer a strong economy over a weak one. We do not mean to imply that Democrats and Republicans prefer identical economic conditions. Our point is simply that approval of the president's handling of the economy is more likely to be rooted in common considerations than approval of job performance. Thus, we might consider economic approval a least likely case for observing polarization. Furthermore, objective economic indicators, such as the unemployment and inflation rates, provide measures of these common considerations. More than job approval, economic approval allows us to isolate the factors that lead partisans to diverge in their evaluations of the president.

This analysis of economic approval focuses on the ways in which partisan groups use the same information differently. In this context, polarization arises when Democrats and Republicans respond differently to the same information about current economic conditions. Because the analysis is across administrations, we can distinguish between different preferences (e.g., Republicans might care more about inflation than unemployment) and polarization (e.g., partisans responding differently depending on which party is in control of the presidency).

1. Even in his vigorous counterargument against claims of rising polarization, Fiorina (2006) concedes that on political "evaluations" such as presidential job approval, polarization has increased.

2. For evidence on the influence of presidential approval on the various branches of government, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1995); Brace and Hinckley (1992); Brody (1991); Canes-Wrone and DeMarchi (2002); Edwards (1980); Fiorina (1981); Gronke and Newman (2003); Gronke, Kock, and Wilson (2003); Marra and Ostrom (1989); Neustadt (1960); Rivers and Rose (1985); Rohde and Simon (1985); Sigelman (1979); Yates (2002); Yates and Whitford (1998).




FIGURE 1. Economic Approval of President Clinton, 1993-1999 (dashed line = high school, dotted line = some college, solid line = college graduate).

Data

The analysis focuses on responses to the question, “Do you approve or disapprove of how [the president] is handling the economy?”³ In order to reduce the sampling error inherent in surveys, we use Stimson’s (1999) WCALC algorithm to combine responses from both Gallup and CBS polls.⁴ We generate nine different series that correspond with the most educated (college degree or more), middle educated (some college education), and least educated (high school degree or less) Democrats, independents, and Republicans. These education groupings serve as a proxy for the most, middle, and least informed segments of the public.⁵

Our first step is to visually examine the different series. Of particular interest is whether we observe partisan polarization on the economic approval question and, if so, whether the most educated show the most or least polarization. After visually examining the series and assessing the correlation between series, we then use an error correction model to evaluate the causal dynamics of opinion change for each subgroup.

Figure 1 reports the percentage of respondents who approved of President Bill Clinton’s handling of the economy from February 1993 to May 1999. (In 2000, there were not enough surveys of economic approval to calculate monthly approval; for this reason, we analyze the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations separately.) The figure includes nine series, which represent the most, middle, and least educated Democrats, independents and Republicans. As expected, Democrats consistently show the most

3. Data used in this analysis were downloaded from the Roper Center’s iPoll database. The raw survey data were used to disaggregate by party and education. Survey dates are listed in the appendix.

4. For full details on this methodology, see Stimson (1999), as well as <http://www.unc.edu/jstimson/resource.html>.

5. If available, a more direct measure of economic information would be preferable. Fortunately, education level corresponds with individuals’ exposure to new information and cognitive ability to think about this information. For these reasons, education is widely used to measure information or awareness (e.g., Alvarez and Brehm 2002, 37, 45; Stimson 2002; Zaller 1994).

TABLE 1
Mean and Standard Deviations of Partisan and Education Series during the Clinton Administration

<i>Party</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
Democrat	High school	66.59	11.87
Democrat	Some college	71.14	11.78
Democrat	College graduate	78.96	9.29
Independent	High school	45.53	14.04
Independent	Some college	49.24	14.77
Independent	College graduate	54.62	13.47
Republican	High school	32.09	13.65
Republican	Some college	29.47	14.96
Republican	College graduate	30.71	15.69

approval of Clinton's handling of the economy and Republicans show the least approval. Consistent with previous findings of similar opinion change across partisan groups (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gerber and Green 1999; Page and Shapiro 1992), the series all follow the same general pattern. Shortly after Clinton takes office, evaluations of his handling of the economy drop, reaching a low point in July 1993. All subgroups then begin to show increasing approval of Clinton's handling of the economy until the beginning of 1998. For the final year and a half of Clinton's term, economic approval levels off. For the most part, however, the series move in parallel, with perhaps a slight convergence beginning in 1997. Thus, if anything, approval of Clinton's handling of the economy offers evidence of partisan convergence, not parallelism. Furthermore, education groups closely cluster by partisanship. During this period, education does not appear to alter the partisan motivations.

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show the mean and standard deviation for the nine series. We see that the variance for Democrats is notably smaller than for Republicans and independents. Much of this is explained by the fact that Democrats start at a higher level of approval and thus cannot rise as steeply as the other two partisan groups.

Figure 2 reports economic approval for President Bush from March 2001 to November 2005. Republicans show the strongest approval of Bush's handling of the economy and Democrats show the lowest levels of approval. Yet, as with Figure 1, the series start at different levels but initially move in similar ways. For example, near the end of 2001, each of the series shows a slight increase in approval. During the next two years, approval levels off and then recedes. Beginning in 2004, however, the series appear to diverge. While Democrats and independents increasingly disapprove of Bush's handling of the economy, Republican approval slowly increases throughout 2004, before decreasing again in 2005. This polarization is notable for two reasons. Even in a question that primes economic considerations, we observe substantial polarization. However, the timing of polarization is also of interest. For approval of the president's handling of the economy, polarization is a recent phenomenon. Also of note, as with Figure 1, education does not appear to moderate partisan motivations. Even when opinions polarize, we do not see evidence that education moderates this effect.




FIGURE 2. Economic Approval of President Bush, 2001-2005 (dashed line = high school, dotted line = some college, solid line = college graduate).

TABLE 2

Mean and Standard Deviations of Partisan and Education Series during the Bush Administration

Party	Education	Mean	Standard Deviation
Democrat	High school	24.7	11.2
Democrat	Some college	21	10.74
Democrat	College graduate	17.6	9.85
Independent	High school	42.88	10.07
Independent	Some college	43.09	9.82
Independent	College graduate	42.88	8.08
Republican	High school	75.28	6.6
Republican	Some college	79.36	5.95
Republican	College graduate	82.04	4.98

In Table 2, the descriptive statistics for President Bush show that the dynamics in economic approval for him are quite different from those of President Clinton. The variance is notably lower across partisan groups and nearly half as much for Republicans as Democrats. These differences between the parties are primarily the by-product of Republicans' steady support (i.e., low variance) for President Bush during this time period.

The correlations in Tables 3 and 4 provide additional information about partisan effects on opinion over time. The upper half of the table contains the correlations between the *differenced* series. The lower half shows the correlations between *levels*. It is useful to examine the correlations both for the levels and differences, as trends in the data tend to inflate the correlations in the levels. For President Clinton, the correlations among the subgroups when the data are in their levels (bottom half of table) are very high within and across partisan groups (all $\gamma > 0.88$). This result reinforces the conclusions regarding similarities across partisan and education groups in Figure 1. For President Bush, the correlations in levels between Republicans and the other two groups are notably lower. For example, the average correlation between the Republican series and other partisan

TABLE 3
Monthly Correlations (Differenced and in Levels) between Education and Partisan Groups during the Clinton Administration

	<i>Dem. HS</i>	<i>Dem SC</i>	<i>Dem CG</i>	<i>Ind HS</i>	<i>Ind SC</i>	<i>Ind CG</i>	<i>Rep HS</i>	<i>Rep SC</i>	<i>Rep CG</i>
Dem Hs	1	0.4	0.4	0.38	0.12	0.25	0.27	0.33	0.29
Dem SC	0.95	1	0.25	0.44	0.1	0.3	0.29	0.27	0.32
Dem CG	0.95	0.97	1	0.47	0.46	0.27	0.43	0.43	0.34
Ind HS	0.94	0.97	0.98	1	0.4	0.24	0.64	0.27	0.22
Ind SC	0.95	0.97	0.98	0.97	1	0.24	0.41	0.37	0.12
Ind CG	0.94	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	1	0.25	0.16	0.37
Rep HS	0.88	0.91	0.93	0.96	0.94	0.93	1	0.22	0.52
Rep SC	0.89	0.92	0.94	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.96	1	0.12
Rep CG	0.88	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.93	0.94	0.97	0.96	1

Note: The bottom half of the table shows the correlations between levels. The top half of the table shows the correlation between differenced series. Bold coefficients reflect within group correlations (i.e., correlations across education groups). $N = 76$.

TABLE 4
Monthly Correlations (Differenced and in Levels) between Education and Partisan Groups during the Bush Administration

	<i>Dem. HS</i>	<i>Dem SC</i>	<i>Dem CG</i>	<i>Ind HS</i>	<i>Ind SC</i>	<i>Ind CG</i>	<i>Rep HS</i>	<i>Rep SC</i>	<i>Rep CG</i>
Dem Hs	1	0.44	0.44	0.55	0.49	0.35	0.27	0.15	0.19
Dem SC	0.94	1	0.5	0.49	0.15	0.24	0.34	0.31	0.28
Dem CG	0.91	0.92	1	0.48	0.35	0.33	0.21	0.33	0.19
Ind HS	0.91	0.94	0.93	1	0.37	0.18	0.37	0.4	0.24
Ind SC	0.88	0.9	0.96	0.94	1	0.42	0.45	0.14	0.14
Ind CG	0.89	0.9	0.93	0.9	0.94	1	0.062	0.073	0.1
Rep HS	0.61	0.7	0.72	0.8	0.79	0.74	1	0.37	0.4
Rep SC	0.5	0.58	0.6	0.68	0.61	0.61	0.84	1	0.22
Rep CG	0.39	0.5	0.54	0.6	0.55	0.5	0.82	0.85	1

Note: The bottom half of the table shows the correlations between levels. The top half of the table shows the correlation between differenced series. Bold coefficients reflect within group correlations (i.e., correlations across education groups). $N = 57$.

series is 0.62, with a range from 0.39 to 0.80. The corresponding values for Clinton are an average correlation of 0.93, with a range from 0.88 to 0.96. These differences confirm that Republicans judged President Bush differently than Democrats and independents over time.

The correlations of the changes (differences) in economic approval (top half of table) tell a slightly different story. The correlations for both presidents are not as robust as the correlations for the levels, demonstrating that changes in the trends account for a substantial amount of the covariation in the levels. But what is surprising (given the time plots) is that the within-party correlations (in bold) are lower than we might have expected in both the Clinton and Bush administrations. In other words, even when groups move together in a broad sense, their month-to-month changes may show unique

variation.⁶ Under Clinton, the lowest correlations within party occur among Republicans, where the correlation among Republicans with a college degree and those with some college is only 0.12. For Bush, low correlations within party also occur among independents, particularly for those with a college degree. During the Bush administration, the views of Republicans with some college education and those with a college degree are again weakly correlated. On the whole, we see that partisan differences are sharper for Bush than for Clinton. Additionally, the analysis of *change* in economic approval of the president reveals some subtle differences *within* the parties (i.e., across education groups) that are not evident in the analysis of *levels* of approval.

Updating in Light of Information

Although partisans regularly evaluate the president's handling of the economy differently (as reflected in different *levels* of partisan evaluations), throughout the Clinton presidency and the first two years of the Bush presidency, the over-time effect of partisanship on economic approval is relatively small. It is not until late 2003 that Democratic and Republican evaluations trend in the opposite directions. We have also seen, however, that an evaluation of trends may inflate perceived similarities across groups. Thus, in the following analysis, we use error correction models (ECMs) to analyze the economic determinants of *changes* in how our partisan and education groups evaluated the president's handling of the economy.⁷

Table 5 reports the results of the ECMs for economic approval of Clinton using objective economic conditions (inflation and unemployment) as explanatory factors.⁸ The analysis shows a surprising and consistent role for unemployment, across party and education groups. The long-term effect of unemployment (i.e., the lagged effect in levels) is significant in each of the models. The short-term effects for unemployment are only significant for high school-educated Democrats, perhaps revealing their more immediate vulnerability to rising unemployment. The long-run effect for inflation, on the other hand, reveals some differences across subgroups. Inflation has a significant impact for independents whose education level is at the high school or some college level and for Republicans with some college.

6. Of course, some of this unique month-to-month variation reflects sampling error in the surveys.

7. Error correction models are also well suited for this analysis because they minimize the risk of estimating a spurious regression when the data trend. As expected based on Figures 1 and 2, ADF and KPSS tests for unit roots show that the series are integrated. However, tests of co-integration do not indicate that the economic approval series are co-integrated with the economic indicators. Thus, the single-equation ECMs conducted here are appropriate.

8. Following previous research (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) we estimated the regression equations for different partisan groups jointly, using Zellner's (1962) system of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) equations. Given the similarities between series in Figures 1 and 2, we expect residuals to be correlated across equations. The SUR models estimates this correlation and incorporates it into the regression, producing more efficient estimates.

TABLE 5
Error Correction Models for Economic Approval by Party by Education 1993-2000

COEFFICIENT	(1) Δdb_s	(2) Δdsc	(3) Δdfg	(4) Δb_s	(5) Δsc	(6) Δfg	(7) Δr_b	(8) Δrc	(9) Δrfg
Δ Unemployment	-5.745** (2.769)	-2.022 (1.856)	-1.432 (1.587)	-0.831 (2.244)	0.768 (2.661)	-0.289 (2.556)	-3.610 (2.937)	-2.734 (3.240)	-1.055 (2.853)
Δ Inflation	0.0942 (0.259)	-0.116 (0.174)	0.0321 (0.153)	-0.408* (0.213)	-0.371 (0.251)	-0.184 (0.242)	-0.112 (0.281)	-0.408 (0.307)	-0.264 (0.274)
Unemployment _{t-1}	2.758*** (0.789)	-1.434** (0.666)	1.868*** (0.482)	2.000*** (0.688)	2.896*** (0.804)	3.864*** (0.830)	-1.840** (0.740)	-2.169** (0.850)	2.251*** (0.738)
Inflation _{t-1}	-0.0495 (0.359)	-0.238 (0.244)	-0.0810 (0.214)	-0.614** (0.300)	-0.661* (0.353)	-0.336 (0.337)	-0.293 (0.398)	-0.820* (0.433)	-0.582 (0.388)
Dependent variable _{t-1}	0.199*** (0.0530)	0.126*** (0.0466)	0.167*** (0.0433)	0.137*** (0.0409)	0.182*** (0.0452)	0.231*** (0.0517)	0.131*** (0.0454)	0.137*** (0.0480)	0.125*** (0.0401)
Constant	28.63*** (7.485)	17.78*** (6.874)	23.80*** (5.945)	19.08*** (5.580)	26.78*** (6.546)	34.93*** (7.262)	15.19*** (5.445)	18.21*** (6.010)	18.02*** (5.259)
Long-run multiplier for unemployment	-12.72	-11.3	-10.7	-14.5	-15.8	-16.52	-13.9	-15.7	-18
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
R ²	0.125	0.049	0.097	0.089	0.104	0.174	0.055	0.112	0.061

Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$.

A similar analysis of the effects of objective conditions on the public's assessment of President Bush's management of the economy is reported in Table 6.⁹ The analysis shows a weaker impact of unemployment on Bush's stewardship of the economy than Clinton's. The long-term impact (lagged levels) of unemployment is only significant for two of the Democratic subgroups, two of the independent subgroups, and none of the Republican subgroups. Inflation does not appear to play a role in the public's evaluation of Bush for any of the subgroups.

The long-run effect does not indicate the *total* effect of a predictor on the dependent variable, which can occur across future time periods. The total effect is captured by the "long-run multiplier" (LRM).¹⁰ We focus on the LRM for unemployment because it is more consistently related to economic approval. The long-run multipliers (reported at the bottom of the tables) do show some differences in the cumulative effect of a change in unemployment. For Clinton, it is lowest for college-educated Democrats, with a cumulative 10.7% decline in economic approval in response to a 1% rise in unemployment, and an 18% decline for college-educated Republicans. In general, Democrats did not punish Clinton for unemployment as much as Republicans.

The results for President Bush are in sharp contrast to those for the Clinton administration. Unemployment has a much bigger impact on Democrats' economic approval than on independents' or Republicans' (LRM of -15.2 for Democrats with some college and -16.1 for those with a college degree). Republicans have the smallest response to changes in unemployment, with LRMs in the -2 to -3 range. There do appear to be some small educational effects at work, as those with a high school education appeared to update in similar fashion regardless of the party with which they associated.

The analysis of the long-run multiplier for unemployment is summarized in Figure 3. The most striking feature of the graph is the strong differences across administrations. Unemployment weighed much more heavily in the public's assessment of President Clinton than President Bush, particularly for independents and Republicans. In addition, comparing Democrats and Republicans across administrations suggests that those from the same party as the president tend to react less to economic news than those from the opposing party. This pattern is much stronger for Republicans than Democrats over this time period. Although these conclusions are tentative, given the analysis only includes two administrations, such a finding is consistent with Lebo and Cassino (2007).

Conclusions and Implications

Recent research suggests that President Bush's administration coincided with a particularly polarizing period among the U.S. public (Jacobson 2006, 2009). Our analysis of approval of the president's handling of the economy reinforces this finding (see also Cohen and Panagopoulos 2009). We have also uncovered several other notable

9. Cohen and Panagopoulos (2009) show that attitudes toward Iraq influenced approval of Bush's handling of the economy, so the analysis for President Bush includes dummy variables for 9/11, the invasion of Iraq (March to May 2003), and the Iraq war.

10. See De Boef and Keele (2008) for a detailed account of how the LRM is calculated.

TABLE 6
Error Correction Models for Economic Approval by Party by Education, 2001-2005

COEFFICIENT	(1) $\Delta lbrs$	(2) Δdsc	(3) Δtgc	(4) $\Delta lbrs$	(5) Δdsc	(6) Δtgc	(7) $\Delta rbrs$	(8) Δrvc	(9) Δrvg
Δ Unemployment	1.742 (3.466)	-3.049 (3.075)	-1.698 (2.301)	2.619 (2.940)	-2.856 (2.361)	-1.890 (2.370)	0.428 (2.946)	0.922 (3.265)	-0.924 (2.269)
Δ Inflation	-1.679 (1.149)	-1.418 (1.025)	-0.437 (0.760)	-0.552 (0.976)	-1.313* (0.775)	-1.418* (0.858)	-1.150 (0.944)	-0.912 (1.041)	-0.336 (0.745)
Unemployment _{t-1}	-1.896 (1.238)	-2.822** (1.176)	3.527*** (1.026)	-0.724 (1.149)	-2.264** (1.070)	3.136*** (1.011)	-0.721 (1.116)	-0.619 (1.299)	-0.0293 (0.949)
Inflation _{t-1}	-0.975 (1.005)	-1.286 (0.928)	-1.291* (0.664)	0.140 (0.834)	-0.564 (0.674)	-0.904 (0.752)	0.0570 (0.776)	-0.390 (0.951)	0.172 (0.655)
Dependent variable _{t-1}	0.287*** (0.0607)	0.201*** (0.0600)	0.268*** (0.0594)	0.195*** (0.0607)	0.237*** (0.0641)	0.400*** (0.0946)	0.254*** (0.0666)	-0.211*** (0.0868)	-0.149*** (0.0666)
Constant	20.17** (9.285)	23.02** (8.986)	27.87*** (7.738)	12.27 (9.566)	24.83*** (9.443)	38.00*** (10.35)	23.20** (10.75)	21.19 (13.87)	11.98 (10.60)
Long-run multiplier for unemployment	-6.4	-15.2	-16.1	-3.6	-9.85	-7.75	-2.88	-3.1	-1.94
Observations	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
R ²	0.398	0.259	0.175	0.282	0.232	0.256	0.144	0.079	0.090

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .1$.




FIGURE 3. Long-Run Multiplier for Unemployment by Administration.

findings. For most of the analysis, education does not appear to moderate partisan updating. The visual analysis of the opinion series as well as the statistical analysis of the determinants of economic approval produce few examples of systematic differences across education groups. During the Clinton presidency, when partisan groups responded in similar ways to economic conditions, this result holds across education groups. During the Bush presidency, we also see similarities. However, the statistical analysis shows some similarities between low-education Democrats and independents and all Republican groups. Such a result provides tentative evidence that polarization has been weakest among the least educated.

It is also important to emphasize what our results suggest about *why* evaluations diverged during the Bush presidency. Analysis shows that Republicans stopped incorporating economic information into their evaluations of President Bush's handling of the economy. This is not just a story about Republicans, however. If economic information had been more positive, Democrats may have been the ones separating their evaluations from economic reality. As more data become available for the Barack Obama presidency, this will be an important question to examine. When the economy improves, it will also be important to see whether partisans update their evaluations in tandem, as they did during good economic times of Clinton, or whether polarization continues to be the pattern, as under Bush. The answers to these questions hold important implications for how the public evaluates the president and the president's ability to influence other branches of government.

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Appendix: Poll Information

Below are the dates for the polls used to calculate the monthly economic approval of the president time series. There were not enough polls conducted in 2000 asking the economic approval question to make the series continuous.

Clinton

Gallup

2/1993, 3/1993, 4/1993, 6/1993, 7/1993, 8/1993, 9/1993, 10/1993, 11/1993, 12/1993
 1/1994, 2/1994, 3/1994, 4/1994, 5/1994, 6/1994, 7/1994, 9/1994, 10/1994, 11/1994,
 12/1994
 1/1995, 2/1995, 6/1995, 7/1995, 12/1995, 6/1996, 11/1996
 3/1997, 5/1997, 11/1997, 6/1998, 7/1998
 1/1999, 3/1999, 4/1999, 6/1999

CBS News

3/1993, 5/1993, 6/1993, 8/1993, 9/1993, 10/1993, 11/1993, 12/1993
 1/1994, 2/1994, 3/1994, 4/1994, 6/1994, 7/1994, 8/1994, 9/1994, 10/1994
 1/1995, 2/1995, 4/1995, 5/1995, 8/1995, 10/1995, 12/1995
 1/1996, 2/1996, 3/1996, 6/1996, 7/1996, 8/1996, 9/1996

1/1997, 3/1997, 4/1997, 7/1997, 11/1997, 12/1997
1/1998, 2/1998, 5/1998, 6/1998, 8/1998, 9/1998, 10/1998, 11/1998, 12/1998
1/1999, 3/1999, 6/1999

George W. Bush

Gallup

3/2001, 4/2001, 5/2001, 6/2001, 8/2001, 10/2001, 12/2001
1/2002, 2/2002, 5/2002, 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002, 9/2002, 10/2002, 11/2002
1/2003, 2/2003, 3/2003, 4/2003, 5/2003, 7/2003, 8/2003, 9/2003, 10/2003, 11/2003,
12/2003
1/2004, 2/2004, 3/2004, 4/2004, 5/2004, 6/2004, 7/2004, 8/2004, 9/2004, 10/2004,
11/2004
1/2005, 2/2005, 4/2005, 5/2005, 6/2005, 8/2005, 9/2005, 11/2005, 12/2005

CBS News

3/2001, 4/2001, 5/2001, 6/2001, 8/2001, 10/2001, 12/2001
1/2002, 2/2002, 5/2002, 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002, 9/2002, 10/2002, 11/2002
1/2003, 2/2003, 3/2003, 4/2003, 5/2003, 7/2003, 8/2003, 9/2003, 10/2003, 11/2003,
12/2003
1/2004, 2/2004, 3/2004, 4/2004, 5/2004, 6/2004, 7/2004, 8/2004, 9/2004, 10/2004,
11/2004